A fault attack on the Niederreiter cryptosystem using binary irreducible
Goppa codesArticle
Authors: Julian Danner ; Martin Kreuzer
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Julian Danner;Martin Kreuzer
A fault injection framework for the decryption algorithm of the Niederreiter
public-key cryptosystem using binary irreducible Goppa codes and classical
decoding techniques is described. In particular, we obtain low-degree
polynomial equations in parts of the secret key. For the resulting system of
polynomial equations, we present an efficient solving strategy and show how to
extend certain solutions to alternative secret keys. We also provide estimates
for the expected number of required fault injections, apply the framework to
state-of-the-art security levels, and propose countermeasures against this type
of fault attack.
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